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Abstract: There is growing evidence that decisions made on behalf of other people differ from the decisions we make for ourselves because
we are less affected by the subjective experience of their outcome. As a result, the decisions we make for other people can be more optimal.
This experiment investigated surrogate decision making using a probability discounting task where participants made choices between risky
and sure options. Psychological distance between the decision maker and the recipient was manipulated by having participants make
decisions for themselves, their friend, and another unknown participant. Risk preferences were closer to neutrality (i.e., more consistent with
expected value) when making decisions on behalf of another participant than when making decisions for themselves or a friend. We conclude
that subjective risk preferences are attenuated in surrogate decision making. Findings are discussed in relation to inconsistencies in the
literature and theories of surrogate decision making.
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A large proportion of our everyday decisions are made on
behalf of other people (Tunney & Ziegler, 2015). In such
cases we act as a surrogate decision maker by making a
decision of which the outcome will impact another person
– the recipient of the decision. Recent models of surrogate
decision making have attempted to uncover the underlying
psychological processes that explain why we often make
decisions for other people that we would not make for
ourselves. The following experiment investigated how
people’s risk preferences differ when making surrogate
decisions as opposed to their own and why that may be
the case. Although this question has already been posed,
the literature concerning surrogate risk preferences
presents inconsistencies which render its answer unclear.
We report an experiment that differs from similar work in
that the decisions that were made had a real outcome
affecting real recipients.
The literature regarding self-other differences in risk
preferences is often contradictory. A substantial amount
suggests that people exhibit less risk aversion when making
decisions for other people than when making decisions for
themselves. This has been found using relationship scenar-
ios (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & Allgaier, 2003; Stone &
Allgaier, 2008; Stone, Choi, de Bruin, & Mandel, 2013;
Wray & Stone, 2005) as well as monetary decision tasks
such as choices between gambles (Chakravarty, Harrison,
Haruvy, & Rutström, 2011; Mengarelli, Moretti, Faralla,
Vindras, & Sirigu, 2014; Polman, 2012; Ziegler & Tunney,
2015). However, there have also been reports using similar
monetary decision tasks that surrogate decisions accentuate
risk aversion (Pahlke, Strasser, & Vieider, 2015; Reynolds,
Joseph, & Sherwood, 2011) and others that report no self-
other differences (Stone, Yates, & Caruthers, 2002).
Benjamin and Robbins (2007) also report an absence of
self-other differences using the Balloon Analog Risk Task
(BART). Using the same investment task, Pollmann,
Potters, and Trautmann (2014) found that risk-taking
increased whereas Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) found that
risk-taking decreased when making decisions for others.
Using a similar task, Kvaløy, Eriksen, and Luzuriaga
(2014) identified that risk-averse participants took more
risks on behalf of another person, whereas risk-seeking
participants took fewer risks. These inconsistencies do
not seem to be attributable to the type of task used. Are
there other methodological differences which might be
informative?
In terms of differences between studies which investi-
gated real and hypothetical decisions, a clear pattern does
not emerge either. Studies which found that risk aversion
decreases in surrogate decisions, in the psychology litera-
ture, used hypothetical decisions for a friend (Beisswanger
et al., 2003; Stone & Allgaier, 2008; Stone et al., 2013;
Wray & Stone, 2005) or for a stranger (Ziegler & Tunney,
2015), and in the economic literature used real decisions
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for a stranger (Chakravarty et al., 2011; Kvaløy et al., 2014;
Mengarelli et al., 2014; Polman, 2012; Pollmann et al.,
2014). Studies which found that risk aversion increases in
surrogate decisions used real decisions for a stranger
(Kvaløy et al., 2014), for the participant and a stranger
(Pahlke, Strasser, & Vieider, 2015), or for a group (Reynolds
et al., 2011). Studies which found an absence of difference
used hypothetical decisions for a friend (Benjamin &
Robbins, 2007; Stone et al., 2002) or real decisions for a
stranger (Stone et al., 2002). From this it is also difficult
to assess the impact of the identity of the recipient,
although real scenarios where the decision maker knew
the recipient were not investigated. In the present experi-
ment, participants made real decisions for themselves, for
a friend and for another unknown participant to test
whether the identity of the recipient affects the outcome
of the decision. Why do we expect these self-other differ-
ences in risk preferences?
Findings suggesting that subjective risk preferences are
attenuated in surrogate decisions are consistent with the
risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, &
Welch, 2001). The hypothesis posits that risk preferences
are the result of emotional reactions to risk, rather than a
purely cognitive evaluation of risk. Given that a surrogate
decision maker is not the recipient of their decision, it fol-
lows that an empathy gap would emerge between them
and the outcome (Loewenstein, 1996). Assuming the pres-
ence of this empathy gap, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis
predicts that when making surrogate decisions people are
less influenced by emotional reactions to risk and therefore
exhibit risk preferences that are closer to risk neutrality.
There is increasing evidence that self-other differences in
decision making can be explained by a tendency toward
less emotional bias when making decisions on behalf of
other people. Indeed, surrogate decisions have been found
to be more optimal than the decisions people make for
themselves. In delay-discounting tasks, people tend to favor
the immediate reward over the larger delayed reward more
often for themselves than for others (Charlton et al., 2013;
Kim, Schnall, & White, 2013; Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy,
2008; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012). This could be the result
of reduced subjective experience of the immediate reward
when one is not the recipient of the decision. It could also
be explained by reduced sensitivity to the uncertainty
associated with choosing the delayed reward, in accordance
with the evidence suggesting that people have different
attitudes toward risk when making decisions on behalf of
other people.
Furthermore, the decision maker is affected by the out-
come differently than the recipient and is likely to adopt
a more reasoned approach to the decision process, thereby
reducing their emotional involvement. According to
construal-level theory, psychological distance between the
decision maker and the recipient of the decision leads to
more abstract thinking (Trope & Liberman, 2010), meaning
that the recipient’s immediate subjective experience of the
outcome is less likely to be taken into account when making
decisions on their behalf. We therefore expect subjective
risk preferences to become increasingly attenuated as
psychological distance between the decision maker and
the recipient increases. Are these predictions supported
by current theories and models of surrogate decision
making? We will consider the contributions of Social
Values Theory (Stone & Allgaier, 2008) and the Egocentric
Anchoring and Adjustment model (Epley, Keysar,
Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004) and show how Tunney
and Ziegler’s model (2015) provides a more comprehensive
framework for addressing self-other differences.
Social Values Theory (Stone & Allgaier, 2008) proposes
that in the domain of risk, self-other differences in deci-
sion making will arise when there is a social value placed
on risk. Based on their previous research which failed to
find self-other differences in monetary decisions (Stone
et al., 2002), they conclude that there is no social value
placed on risk in monetary decisions. Given the amount
of evidence suggesting that there are such self-other
differences, this conclusion is difficult to believe. It also
seems unlikely that all decisions made on behalf of other
people are based solely on social values and ignore factors
such as the identity of the recipient. In fact, most of the
evidence supporting Social Values Theory is based on
differences between decisions people make for themselves
and a friend (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Stone & Allgaier,
2008; Stone et al., 2002, 2013). A different pattern of
self-other differences may appear when the recipient is
not a friend.
The Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment model (Epley
et al., 2004) suggests that when adopting another’s
perspective, people use their own as an anchor and adjust
from it. The level of adjustment accounts for differences
between the decision maker and the recipient and stops
once a plausible estimate is reached. Surrogate decisions
are therefore egocentrically biased. Ziegler and Tunney
(2012) conducted a delay-discounting study where partici-
pants made decisions for themselves and a variety of recip-
ients who varied in psychological distance from them (i.e.,
varied in degree of relatedness) and found that choices
made for others varied systematically from choices made
for the self as psychological distance increased, which is
what we predict in this experiment. The model assumes
that decisions are based on adopting the recipient’s
perspective, however there might be cases where the deci-
sion-maker wishes to make a decision based on what they
want or on what they think is in the recipient’s best interest.
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Tunney and Ziegler’s (2015) model of surrogate decision
making assumes that the decision maker engages in
perspective-taking which varies according to the features
of the surrogate decision. They could consider what is in
the recipient’s best interest (benevolent perspective),
what they would do if they were the recipient (projected
perspective), and try to simulate what the recipient would
choose (simulated perspective). They may also make a deci-
sion that serves their own interest irrespective of the wishes
of the recipient (egocentric perspective). The decision
maker compares the outcomes of different perspectives
and computes a subjective utility estimation, which is dis-
torted by a number of biasing factors. The significance of
the decision and accountability of the decision maker are
expected to play a role. The relationship between the deci-
sion maker and the recipient is also predicted to impact the
decision process: familiarity and similarity with the recipi-
ent will influence the decision maker’s ability to engage
in simulated perspective-taking, while higher proximity
and closeness between the decision maker and the recipi-
ent will increase the decision maker’s emotional involve-
ment in the decision process. Designs which differ in
terms of the significance of the decision, accountability of
the decision maker, and identity of the recipient are likely
to find distinct patterns in self-other differences, which
could explain some of the inconsistencies in the literature
concerning risk.
The present experiment used a probability discounting
task, which involves choosing between a guaranteed reward
and a chance of winning another reward. Participants often
discount the probabilistic reward in favor of a guaranteed
reward of lower expected value: the subjective value of a
reward decreases when its occurrence is probabilistic. As
the rate of discounting is faster for higher than lower
probabilities, probability discounting is best described by a
hyperbolic curve representing the subjective value of the
probabilistic reward as a function of the probability of
obtaining the reward (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991).
As stated above there is evidence that delay-discounting
rates are reduced in surrogate decision making, but there
is no evidence as of yet that probability discounting rates
are also reduced. Given that discounting the probabilistic
option is considered risk-averse, we predict that discount
rates will decrease systematically as psychological distance
between the decision maker and the recipient increases.
Participants’ compensation was made contingent on their
decisions as well as those that others made for them so that
participants knew that they were making real decisions.
Although other studies have reported little or no conse-
quence of using real versus hypothetical rewards in proba-
bility discounting (Hinvest & Anderson, 2010; Matusiewicz,
Carter, Landes, & Yi, 2013), the data remains equivocal and
has not been investigated in surrogate decision making.
Method
Design
A within-subjects design was used where participants made
decisions for themselves, their friend, and another
unknown participant. The independent variable was the
recipient of the decisions and the dependent variable was
the probability discount rates. The order of presentation
of each recipient was counterbalanced across participants.
Ethics Statement
Ethics approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee at
the University of Nottingham, reference 808.
Participants
Participants (n = 110) were recruited in pairs from the
University of Nottingham. Participants were asked to come
in with a friend who would be taking part in the experiment
as well. Although the level of friendship was not controlled
for, because participants were recruited in pairs, some level
of familiarity was assumed. The age and gender of partici-
pants within each pair were not controlled for. The age
group ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 22.9, SD = 3.43).
There were 49 males and 61 females.
Probability Discounting Task
The probability discounting task was performed on a
computer using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). The task con-
sisted of three conditions: participants made decisions
either for themselves, for their friend, or for another partic-
ipant. All trials consisted of making a choice between a sure
option and a probabilistic option using the “up” and
“down” arrow keys. The trials were presented in blocks
of probabilities, from the highest to the lowest, within which
the sure options were presented in descending order. There
were 11 sure options (£95, £85, £75, £65, £55, £45, £35,
£25, £15, £10, £5) and 7 sets of probabilities of winning
£100 (95%, 90%, 70%, 50%, 30%, 10%, 5%). Each sure
option was presented with each probabilistic option once.
All 77 trials were presented in the same order in each
condition. There was no deadline for responding.
Participant Compensation
A participant’s compensation was the sum of the outcomes
of three choices: a choice that participant made for them-
selves, a choice their friend made for them, and a choice
the previous participant made for them. Only a proportion
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of that sum was received and was set so that compensations
were on average £3. Participants were told that one of the
trials in each condition was real – a proportion of its out-
come would constitute part of its recipient’s compensa-
tion. The real trial was always the choice between “£45
for sure” and a “50% chance of winning £100” as both
options have similar expected values. To minimize recipro-
cation between participants and their friend, they were not
given a breakdown of their compensation.
Procedure
Pairs of participants were tested at the same time, in the
same room, on separate computers. Communication
between the two participants was not permitted. The exper-
imenter remained in the room throughout. Once the
probability discounting task was completed by both partic-
ipants, the experimenter prepared their compensation.
If the probabilistic option was chosen on a probe trial, its
outcome was computer generated.
Results
The indifference points for each probability and recipient
(self, friend, other) were generated for every participant.
The indifference point is the value at which the participant
is equally likely to choose the sure option and the proba-
bilistic option – the participant’s subjective value of the
probability. The average of the sure values immediately
before and after participants switched from choosing the
sure option to the probabilistic option was taken as the
indifference point. If participants always selected the
probabilistic option, £95 was considered the indifference
point; if they always selected the sure option, £5 was
considered the indifference point.
In the case where for any given probability participants
crossed over from one option to the other twice, the
average of the two indifference points was taken as their
indifference point. If they crossed over more than twice,
an indifference point was not generated. A few participants
switched from the probabilistic option to the sure option
rather than the other way around and were excluded
from the entire analysis on suspicion that they did not
understand the task. When trials switched to the next
probability participants sometimes selected the probabilistic
option instead of the sure option, presumably by accident;
in that case, indifference points were not generated. One
participant was excluded for making stereotyped responses
(i.e., always pressing the same button) on suspicion that
they did not understand the task. Participants who were still
missing more than two indifference points for a given
recipient were excluded from the entire analysis as a reli-
able discount curve could not be fitted to their data.
Discount rates were estimated for the remaining partici-
pants (n = 99). Probability discounting is best described by a
hyperbolic discount curve1 (Rachlin et al., 1991) where the
stated probability (p) is transformed to the odds against
winning (θ), where θ = (1/p)  1. The subjective discounted
value (v) of an amount (V) is discounted as a function (h) of
the odds against winning (θ) the amount (V):
v ¼ V
1þ hθ : ð1Þ
The parameter h which describes discount rates across
probabilities was estimated separately for every participant
using a nonlinear regression. Participants had one value of
h for each recipient. The h parameters were then log-trans-
formed as they were highly positively skewed. Higher
values of h indicate higher levels of discounting. The indif-
ference points from which individual values of h were
estimated are shown in Figure 1.
The discount rates (log h values) for self (M = 0.6,
SD = 0.64, CI [0.47, 0.72]) were higher than the discount
rates for friend (M = 0.55, SD = 0.66, CI [0.42, 0.68])
and the discount rates for other (M = 0.36, SD = 0.67, CI
[0.23, 0.5]) (see Figure 2). To test whether discount rates
differed across recipients, the log h values were entered into
a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
recipient as the within-subjects factor. Mauchly’s test indi-
cated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated
(p < .001), therefore degrees of freedom were corrected
using the Greenhouse-Geisser method. There was a signif-
icant effect of recipient (F1.67,163.692 = 9.538, MSE = 0.186,
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.089). There was also a significant linear
1 There exists another mathematical description of probability discounting, the hyperboloid discount function, which has been found to be a
better fit to the data (Green & Myerson, 2004). This version adds a free parameter s which is said to describe the nonlinear psychophysical
scaling of amount (V) and/or odds against (θ):
v ¼ V
1þhθð Þ3
However, the parameter h describes the rate of discounting when s is held constant (Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003) and there is evidence that in
probability discounting s is not held constant and is amount-dependent, meaning that the psychophysical scaling interpretation of s is incorrect
(McKerchar, Green, & Myerson, 2010; Myerson, Green, & Morris, 2011). Given that the interpretation of s is unclear and the aim here is to
compare rates of discounting across conditions, s is not a useful parameter. Additionally, the parameter s is usually needed when different
amounts (V) are used within the same experiment, whereas here the amount (V) was held constant. In light of this, the hyperbolic discount curve
was used to compute values of h.
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trend by recipient (F1,98 = 16.021, MSE = 0.167, p < .001,
ηp
2 = 0.141). Paired-sample t-tests revealed that self-
discount rates were significantly higher than other discount
rates (t98 = 4.003, p < .001), that friend discount rates were
significantly higher than other discount rates (t98 = 2.814,
p = .006) but that self and friend were not significantly
different from each other (t98 = 1.158, p = .250).
Probability discounting assumes that people are risk-
averse, as they are expected to discount the probabilistic
option in favor of the sure option when the latter’s expected
value is lower than the former’s. We therefore predicted
that people will be less risk-averse when making decisions
on behalf of other people. However, there were a propor-
tion of participants (n = 10) who were risk-seeking for
themselves rather than risk-averse (risk-seeking from an
economic perspective, i.e., choosing a probabilistic option
which has a lower expected value than the sure option).
Given the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, such individuals
would be expected to be less risk-seeking for other people
than themselves, rather than less risk-averse. Indeed,
risk-seeking participants show the opposite pattern to risk-
averse participants (see Figure 3). Therefore it can be
predicted that people make decisions on behalf of other
people that are closer to risk neutrality than the decisions
they make for themselves.
To test this prediction, a new dependent variable was
generated to measure how far participant’s decisions devi-
ated from risk neutrality (log h = 0). The discount rates for
self (M = 0.66, SD = 0.58, CI [0.54, 0.77]) deviated more
from risk neutrality than the discount rates for friend
(M = 0.62, SD = 0.59, CI [0.5, 0.74]) and the discount rates
for other (M = 0.54, SD = 0.54, CI [0.43, 0.65]). To test
whether discount rates deviated from risk neutrality differ-
ently across recipients (self, friend, other), the new log h
values were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with
recipient as the within-subjects factor. There was a signifi-
cant effect of recipient (F2,196 = 4.614, MSE = 0.075,
p = .011, ηp
2 = 0.045). There was also a significant linear
trend by recipient (F1,98 = 11.273, MSE = 0.059, p = .001,
ηp
2 = 0.103). Paired-sample t-tests revealed that self-
discount rates deviated significantly more from risk neutral-
ity than other discount rates (t98 = 3.358, p = .001) but that
there was no difference between friend and other
(t98 = 1.883, p = .063) and between self and friend
(t98 = 0.920, p = .360).
Discussion
The results replicate previous findings showing that partic-
ipants discount probabilistic options in favor of sure options
more often than expected utility theory would predict
(Rachlin et al., 1991). In accordance with prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the indifference points show
that participants underweighted large probabilities and
overweighed small probabilities.
The key finding was differences in self-other decision
making. Surrogate decisions became increasingly different
from decisions made for the self as psychological distance
between the decision maker and the recipient increased.
As predicted, participants had shallower rates of discounting
Figure 1. The average subjective values of £100 across participants as
a function of the probability of receiving £100 for each recipient (self,
friend, other), as well as the expected value (EV) of the probability of
receiving £100. Subjective values that are lower than the expected
value are considered risk-averse whereas subjective values that are
higher than the expected value are considered risk-seeking.
Figure 2. Discount rates for each recipient (self, friend, other) with
error bars representing the standard error of the mean. Higher values
of log h indicate higher levels of discounting or risk aversion.
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in surrogate decisions, meaning that the decisions they
made for others were closer to those predicted by the
expected value – arguably more economically rational.
Therefore, consistent with a large proportion of previous
findings, participants made more risk-averse decisions for
themselves than for other people. However, around 10%
of participants were risk-seeking when making decisions
for themselves, meaning that they chose the probabilistic
option over the sure option more often than expected utility
theory would predict. Interestingly, these participants were
less risk-seeking for others than themselves, or more risk-
averse. They show self-other differences in the opposite
direction as do risk-averse participants, although given the
low frequency of such participants, statistical differences
cannot be reliably computed. Nevertheless, participants’
decisions were closer to risk neutrality when making
decisions for a stranger than when making decisions for
themselves or for their friend. Taken together, these results
suggest that people’s risk preferences are attenuated in sur-
rogate decision making, as expected by the risk-as-feelings
hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Participants made similar decisions for themselves and
for their friends, but made decisions that were closer to risk
neutrality on behalf of the other participant. People are
likely to be more affected by the outcome of the decision
they make on behalf of a friend than a stranger. In the case
of someone who is risk-averse, it follows that they would
not want to take more risks for a friend than they would
take for themselves. However, when making a decision
on behalf of a stranger, their decision process is less
affected by the negative prospect of taking a risk that does
not pay off if they consider the decision to be a reasonable
assessment of risk. Similarly, Ziegler and Tunney (2012)
found that surrogate decisions were less impulsive – or
more rational – as psychological distance between the
decision maker and the recipient increased, and that
decisions for a friend were closest to decisions for the self
while decisions for a stranger were the furthest.
A crucial difference between the friend and the other
condition was that participants’ friends were sitting next
to them during the experiment whereas they never crossed
paths with the other participant. This spatial proximity will
have further reduced psychological distance between the
decision maker and their friend, which probably con-
tributed to the absence of difference between decisions
made for the self and decisions made for a friend. Perhaps
if the other participant had been in the room as well there
would have been less of a difference between self and other
decisions, although studies have reported self-other differ-
ences while the recipient and the decision maker were in
the same room (Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2010; Pahlke et al.,
2015; Polman, 2012). Furthermore, the same trend was
found by Ziegler and Tunney (2012) where participants
made decisions for hypothetical others (including friend
and stranger), therefore indicating that the results are not
solely attributable to differences in spatial proximity.
Nevertheless, whether the results are due to differences
in relationship’s closeness or spatial proximity, they are
both manifestations of psychological distance and support
the suggested theoretical explanations of self-other differ-
ences in surrogate decision making (Tunney & Ziegler,
2015). The question remains as to whether the effects of
psychological distance are indeed additive. The use of a
within-subjects design could have accentuated the salience
of self-other differences, although these differences have
also been found in between-subject designs using real
monetary decisions (Polman, 2012; Pollmann et al., 2014).
Similar results have been reported when comparing
people’s decisions and their predictions of other people’s.
Hsee and Weber (1997) found that participants were highly
risk-averse when making decisions for themselves but pre-
dicted that other people would be less risk-averse. No dif-
ference was found when participants made predictions for
someone who sat next to them. Faro and Rottenstreich
(2006) report that people systematically predict others’
choices to be closer to risk neutrality than their own
choices: when people are risk-averse they predict others
to be less risk-averse, but when people are risk-seeking they
predict others to be less risk-seeking. The difference
between choices and predictions was substantially dimin-
ished when the other person was a close friend or when
participants were told to put themselves “in the shoes” of
the other person. Both papers interpret their findings in
Figure 3. Discount rates of risk-averse versus risk-seeking
participants for each recipient (self, friend, other) with error bars
representing the standard error of the mean. A log h value of zero
indicates risk-neutrality, above zero indicates risk-aversion, and
below zero indicates risk-seeking.
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relation to the empathy gap, stating that an ability to
empathize with the other person will increase the predic-
tor’s dependence on his own risk preferences rather than
risk neutrality to make a prediction. The findings we report
here replicate these patterns, suggesting that people may
make surrogate decisions in accordance with what they pre-
dict the recipient’s risk preferences to be.
In terms of interpreting these results relative to theories
of surrogate decision making, Social Values Theory (Stone
& Allgaier, 2008) is unhelpful as it does not predict self-
other differences in monetary decision making. The Ego-
centric Anchoring and Adjustment model (Epley et al.,
2004) can only account for the fact that decisions made
on behalf of others deviated systematically from decisions
made for the self as psychological distance between the
decision maker and the recipient increased. Tunney and
Ziegler’s (2015) model can explain self-other differences
in terms of calibration – relationship between decision
maker and recipient – and ability to empathize with the
recipient. In fact, it would be useful to assess or manipulate
the latter in future research. It is also possible that partici-
pants felt they would be held accountable by their friend
for their decisions, which led them to be as risk-averse
when making decisions for their friend as for themselves.
Indeed, Pollmann et al. (2014) found that being held
accountable mitigates self-other differences by increasing
risk aversion in surrogate decisions. Given the evidence
concerning predictions of others’ risk preferences, perhaps
participants were making a simulated decision – in accor-
dance with what they thought others’ risk preferences were.
This would imply that people are not able to make an accu-
rate simulated decision if on the one hand they rely on their
own risk preferences when they can empathize with the
recipient and on the other they revert to risk neutrality
when they cannot empathize with the recipient. In the for-
mer case, they are in fact making a projected decision
whereas in the latter, they are perhaps making a more
benevolent decision.
Finally, the present findings help to explain some of the
inconsistencies in the literature regarding self-other differ-
ences in risky decision making. Firstly, the identity of the
recipient of the decision clearly has an impact on the deci-
sion process; concluding that there are no self-other differ-
ences in risky decision making from findings where the
recipient was a friend would be misleading. Secondly, a fail-
ure to examine potential differences in surrogate decision
making between people who tend to be risk-averse and peo-
ple who tend to be risk-seeking would be responsible for an
absence of self-other differences if they cancel each other
out. Identifying whether a decision is risk-seeking or risk-
averse is problematic however; it is debatable whether being
indifferent between a sure option and a probabilistic option
of equal expected value in probability discounting can be
taken as risk neutrality. Lastly, it is possible that finding that
people make less risk-seeking decisions on behalf of other
people is the product of an experimental design which
encourages participants to be risk-seeking for themselves.
Conclusion
The present findings support that there exist self-other
differences in surrogate decision making involving risk.
Risk preferences are attenuated when making decisions
for other people: risk-averse participants take more risks
for others whereas risk-seeking participants take less. This
is a valuable contribution to previous findings given that
decisions had an outcome that affected real recipients
and that there is no published research looking at probabil-
ity discounting in surrogate decision making. To avoid
further inconsistencies in the literature, the role the identity
of the recipient has on the decision process should be more
carefully considered. Self-other differences arose when
making decisions for a stranger but not a friend, which sug-
gests they vary depending on the identity of the recipient.
To deepen our understanding of surrogate decision making,
it would be interesting to investigate whether participants
were actually engaging in simulated perspective-taking or
if they were simply less biased toward their own risk pref-
erence when making their decision.
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